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I. INTRODUCTION
Because Congress possesses plenary3 and nearly unbounded4
power to regulate matters of immigration policy, immigration law
has traditionally been an exclusively federal consideration.5 In the
1990s, federal immigration laws were revised with the goal of dis-
couraging undocumented immigrants from remaining in the
United States by restricting their access to public benefits.6 Over
the past several years, state legislators have become frustrated
with what they perceive to be inadequate federal efforts to address
the problems created by the large number of undocumented immi-
1. The term “undocumented immigrant” will be used throughout this article as
the term “illegal immigrant” is generally considered pejorative. See Susan E. Babb,
Analysis of An Analogy: Undocumented Children and Illegitimate Children, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 697, n.1 (1983).
2. J.D., magna cum laude, University of Miami School of Law, May 2013. I am
indebted to the talented editorial staff of this journal. Grateful acknowledgments are
due to Eric S. Boos and Jamie Lynn Vanaria. I would like to take this opportunity to
show my appreciation to Prof. Sergio J. Campos and Prof. Ricardo J. Bascuas. Their
contributions to my legal education gave me the skills to draft this note. Finally, I
must thank my family and Ashley Danielle Knarr. Their support of my efforts
enabled this achievement.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10 (1979).
4. Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 9 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1993).
5. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
6. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2010) (placing federal constraints on a state’s ability to offer
public benefits to undocumented immigrants); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (limiting the ability of
undocumented immigrants to qualify for higher education tuition benefits).
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grants living in the U.S.7 This frustration has resulted in an explo-
sion of immigration-related legislation at the state level.8 The
number of state bills relating to immigration matters has
increased five-fold between 2005 and 2011.9 State immigration
laws have built on the existing federal goals of removing the
incentives for undocumented immigrants to remain within their
borders and have sought to enhance the ability of state law
enforcement agencies to administer federal immigration laws.10
Notably, the controversial 2010 Arizona law, Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, specifically established
a state policy of “attrition through enforcement.”11 Though chal-
lenged by the federal government as an intrusion into an area of
exclusive federal authority, the U.S. Supreme Court substantially
upheld the Arizona law in 2012.12
A major front in this “war of attrition” is the battle over how
much access undocumented immigrants should have to public
education benefits. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court explicitly
prohibited states from denying access to free public elementary
and secondary educations to undocumented immigrants.13 How-
ever, the law remains murky when it comes to post-secondary
education tuition benefits. Within the statutory framework of
overlapping state and federal immigration policy, undocumented
immigrants are generally ineligible for residency-based tuition
benefits at public post-secondary educational institutions.14 Resi-
dency based tuition benefits—‘in-state tuition’—refer to the
7. See Dina Francesca Haynes, Symposium Forward, Crossing the Border: The
Future of Immigration Law and its Impact on Lawyers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 303
(2011) (“it comes as little surprise that states have begun to press the federal
government with the implicit threat: if you do not assist us in providing services to
the noncitizens within our state, we will pass our own laws and take matters into our
own hands.”)
8. Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in States (Jan. 1–Dec. 31, 2012),
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2012-immigration
-related-laws-jan-december-2012.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (requiring, inter alia,
officers conducting a stop, detention or arrest to verify the person’s federal
immigration status and giving state and local law enforcement officers specific
investigative duties and arrest authority over certain classes of undocumented
immigrants).
11. Id.
12. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (prohibiting states from offering these benefits to
undocumented immigrants unless the state is willing to offer the benefit to all U.S.
citizens regardless of their residency within the state).
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reduced tuition rate offered to state residents who attend a public
post-secondary educational institution within the state.15 In order
to establish state residency for purposes of in-state tuition bene-
fits, many states look to the residency of a student’s parents if the
parents claim the student as a dependent for tax purposes.16 Since
undocumented immigrants cannot establish legal residency
within a state, the eligibility of their U.S. citizen children for in-
state tuition benefits is a complex legal question. Michelle J. Seo
addresses this issue in her article “Uncertainty of Access: U.S. Cit-
izen Children of Undocumented Immigrant Parents and In-State
Tuition for Higher Education.”17 Seo worries that “citizen children
are in danger of becoming the unsuspecting victims of state and
federal policies aimed at addressing illegal immigration.”18
If the U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants are
in danger of becoming casualties in the war of attrition against
undocumented immigrants, the Southern Poverty Law Center’s
(SPLC) recent victory in Ruiz v. Robinson19 may stem the
onslaught. In Ruiz, the SPLC challenged Florida’s system of
administering in-state tuition benefits because Florida classified
dependent U.S. citizen students who reside in Florida as non-
residents based on their parents’ federal immigration status. The
SPLC prevailed on its motion for summary judgment and Judge
K. Michael Moore issued a final order which declared Sections 6A-
10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Administrative
Code to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.20  The
court’s ruling rests in part on its finding that tuition benefits
should properly been seen as flowing to the student, and not to the
household, in cases where the citizen student is a dependent child.
However, the opinion did not consider how Florida’s policy of clas-
sifying students as either dependent or independent can continue
if tuition is not a household benefit. As a result, the decision may
15. See infra Part II and accompanying notes for a discussion of how in-state
tuition benefits operate.
16. Id.
17. Michelle J. Seo, Uncertainty of Access: U.S. Citizen Children of Undocumented
Immigrant Parents and In-State Tuition for Higher Education, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 311, 312 (2011).
18. Id. at 312 (citing Bill Piatt, Born As Second Class Citizens In The U.S.A.:
Children Of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35, 54, n.2 (1988)).
19. Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
20. Final Judgment at 2, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
(No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF. No. 109).
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result in ambiguity as to how Florida can award in-state tuition
benefits without running afoul of federal law.
This note will analyze the decision in Ruiz v. Robinson and
suggest that it is a symptom of the burgeoning tension between
the state and federal government on immigration matters. Part II
will outline how in-state tuition benefits are awarded in general,
and explain why Florida’s system was ripe for the SPLC’s chal-
lenge. Part III will explain the proceedings in Ruiz and highlight
why Judge Moore’s decision could lead to tension within the
existing framework of post-secondary education benefits. Part IV
will conclude by suggesting that the problems created by Ruiz
cannot be resolved by the courts, or by the state legislatures, but
must be resolved by Congress.
II. THE TWO-TIERED STRUCTURE OF IN-STATE TUITION
BENEFITS FOR U.S. CITIZEN CHILDREN OF
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS21
Although the award public benefits at the state level—includ-
ing tuition benefits for post-secondary educational institutions—is
ordinarily a matter of state law,22 federal law restricts the ability
of states to confer benefits on undocumented immigrants.23  As
federal immigration policy is aimed at deterring undocumented
immigrants from remaining in the U.S., there are two federal laws
that directly address the ability of states to confer in-state tuition
benefits on undocumented immigrants. These two statutes are the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA)24 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).25 The PRWORA was a general enti-
tlement reform act intended to reduce dependency on government
aid, and the IIRIRA was similarly intended to encourage personal
responsibility among immigrants and reduce the ability of
undocumented immigrants to rely on government aid.26 The
21. This section builds on the analysis done by Seo, supra note 17 at 323-25.
22. The conferral of public benefits by states remain subject to the obvious
limitations on state power that exist in all contexts. For example, states cannot confer
benefits in discriminatory ways that violate the U.S. Constitution.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1621.
24. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Welfare
Reform Act) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, & 42 U.S.C.).
25. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 18
U.S.C.).
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (“Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United
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PRWORA excluded undocumented aliens from the class of aliens
eligible to receive public benefits, which include tuition benefits
for post-secondary education.27 The IIRIRA addresses post-secon-
dary education benefits directly and attaches a serious condition
to a state’s ability to offer tuition benefits to undocumented immi-
grants.28  The IIRIRA does not prohibit states from offering in-
state tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants but requires
as follows:
[A]n alien who is not lawfully present in the United States
shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State
(or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education
benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is
eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration,
and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or
national is such a resident.29
This condition affectively prohibits states from offering in-state
tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants because extending
in-state tuition benefits to all U.S. citizens would be a significant
blow to a state’s revenue.30 For convenience, the relevant portions
of PRWORA and IIRIRA will be referred to as Section 1623, as
this is where they are currently codified in the United States
Code.
Due to the financial impracticability of extending in-state tui-
tion benefits to all U.S. citizens, no state in the country formally
extends such benefits to undocumented immigrants on the basis of
their residence within the state. Nonetheless, ten states have cap-
italized on a loophole in IIRIRA and confer in-state tuition bene-
States immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes. It
continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that aliens within the
Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely
on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and
private organizations, and the availability of public benefits not constitute an
incentive for immigration to the United States.”) (internal paragraph indicators
omitted).
27. 8 U.S.C § 1623.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a).
29. Id.
30. E.g., Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“extending
the benefit of in-state tuition rates to all nonresident U.S. citizens currently enrolled
in Florida’s public universities and colleges would result in a loss of $200,000,000 in
tuition revenue per year, a significant negative impact on Florida’s public universities
and colleges, which depend on being able to charge full tuition rates to admitted
applicants who do not qualify for in-state tuition rates.”) (quoting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment).
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fits on a basis other than residency within the state.31 These ten
states are as follows: California,32 Illinois,33 Kansas,34 Nebraska,35
New Mexico,36 New York,37 Texas,38 Utah,39 Washington,40 and
Wisconsin.41 In 2003, Oklahoma also extended in-state tuition
benefits to undocumented immigrants, but the statute was
repealed in 2007.42 The ten states that currently grant in-state tui-
tion benefits to undocumented immigrants condition the receipt of
the benefits on whether the undocumented immigrant attended
secondary school within the state. By doing so, they condition the
receipt of in-state tuition benefits on something other than resi-
dency within the state and hence, manage to skirt the require-
ments of IIRIRA.43
This loophole has not been extensively challenged and it is
difficult to predict whether it would be upheld in a federal court.
Only the Supreme Court of California has specifically examined
the question and upheld a statutory scheme that grants in-state
tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants who graduate from
high school within a state, while denying in-state tuition benefits
to U.S. citizens who reside outside the state.44  One reason for the
lack of litigation on the issue may be because of the difficulty a
challenger faces in establishing standing. At least one potential
challenge has been thwarted on this basis. In 2005, a group of stu-
dents who were paying non-resident tuition in Kansas regents
schools brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas, alleging that the Kansas statutory scheme deprived them
of a federally guaranteed right to pay in-state tuition.45 The plain-
tiffs’ claims were dismissed for lack of standing because the plain-
31. Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the
Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE
L. REV. 1757, 1765 (2009).
32. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68130.5 (West 2002).
33. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305 / 7e-5 (2013).
34. K.S.A. §76-731a (2012).
35. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-502 (2012).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. §21-1-1.2 (2010).
37. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §355(2)(h)(8) (2013).
38. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (2005).
39. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (2002).
40. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B. 15.012 (2012).
41. WIS. STAT. § 36.27 (2011).
42. OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 70, § 3242, repealed by Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act of 2007 (H.B. 1804)].
43. See, e.g, Martinez v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859-60
(Cal. 2010).
44. Id.
45. Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (D. Kan. 2005).
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tiffs were not subject to the provisions of the statute they
challenged and, therefore, could not establish injury-in-fact.46
A survey of the in-state eligibility and residency requirements
of all fifty states leaves it unclear how these states would classify
the U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants.47 This is
because in most states dependent students are classified as
residents of a state only if his or her parents can establish resi-
dency within the state.48 If the student receives the benefit
because his or her parent has been classified as a resident, it is
extremely unclear whether federal law would require states to
extend in-state tuition to all U.S. citizens. If the state considers
the residency of the students’ parents in order to extend the bene-
fit, that benefit might be seen as flowing to the parent and not the
child, triggering Section 1623.
Three states have explicitly explained how their states would
classify U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants for
purposes of establishing their eligibility for in-state tuition.49
These states are Virginia,50 Colorado,51 and Florida.52 Signifi-
cantly, none of these states answered the question through stat-
ute. In all three cases, the issue was addressed through the state’s
executive branch. In Colorado53 and Virginia,54 residency statutes
were interpreted in memos released by each state’s respective
46. Id. at 1033.
47. Seo, supra note 17, at 325.
48. Id.
49. That is not to say that other states don’t have comparable policies of denying
tuition benefits to the U.S. Citizen children of undocumented immigrants by
conditioning receipt of the benefits on the legal residency of the parent. For example,
New Jersey had an administrative regulation almost identical to the Florida
regulation at issue in Ruiz. N.J.A.C. 9A:9-2.2. This administrative regulation was
struck down by the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division on reasoning
similar to the reasoning of Ruiz. A.Z. v. Higher Education Student Assistance
Authority, 48 A.3d 1151 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). However, it appears that
only Virginia, Colorado, and Florida have explicitly addressed in-state tuition
benefits. The policies of other states address state scholarships or benefits distinct
from in-state tuition.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-7.4(C) (2010).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-7-110 (2010).
52. FLA. STAT. §1009.21 (2011).
53. Colo. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 07-03/HE AGBCF (2007), available at http://www.
coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/ag_opinions/2007/no_07_03_ag_alpha_no_he_he_agbcf_
august_14_2007 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Colorado Memorandum].
54. Ronald C. Forehand, Memorandum from Ronald C. Forehand, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of VA, to Lee Andes, State Council of
Higher Educ. for VA (2008), available at http://acluva.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/
12/20080306AGmemoInStateTuition.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) [hereinafter
Virginia Memorandum].
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attorney general. In Florida, administrative regulations were
promulgated, which explained how state universities were to
administer the state’s residency statutes.55
Ultimately, Colorado and Virginia adopted opposite conclu-
sions. The attorney general of Colorado concluded that the citizen-
ship status of a parent could not be a basis for denying in-state
tuition benefits to resident U.S. citizens.56  The attorney general of
Virginia stated that Virginia’s statute precluded undocumented
immigrants from establishing residency on behalf of their citizen
children.57 The Virginia Memorandum broke the issue down into
two questions: first, could an undocumented immigrant be consid-
ered a legal resident of Virginia; second, could the citizen child of
such a parent be eligible for in-state tuition benefits.58 The first
part was dispensed with by the following conclusory determina-
tion: “it is clear that a person who is not lawfully present in the
United States—the parents, in this case—may not be domiciled in
Virginia. We need not go into further analysis of this point.”59 As
to the student’s eligibility, the attorney general stated that depen-
dent students “ ‘stand in the shoes of their parents’ with respect to
domicile.”60 The attorney general supported his determination
with reference to the Virginia Code and the State Council of
Higher Education for Virginia Domicile Guidelines.61 However,
the memorandum does allow for U.S. citizen children of undocu-
mented immigrants to challenge their presumption of ineligibility
by presenting evidence of residency in Virginia on a case-by-case
basis.62
Although the attorney general of Colorado reached the oppo-
site conclusion, he also divided his analysis into two parts.63  First,
the attorney general had to determine whether citizen children of
undocumented immigrant parents are eligible for in-state tuition
as a matter of federal law.64 Second, the attorney general had to
determine what it meant to be domiciled in Colorado under Colo-
rado law.65 The memorandum concluded that, as a matter of fed-
55. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 6A-10.044 (adopted 1992); id. at 72-1.001 (2011).
56. Colorado Memorandum, supra note 53.




61. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 23-.7.4(C) (2010).
62. Virginia Memorandum, supra note 54.
63. Colorado Memorandum, supra note 53.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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eral law, U.S. citizen children were necessarily eligible for in-state
tuition benefits because they are U.S. citizens.66 In reaching this
conclusion, the attorney general essentially found that tuition
benefits flow to the student and not to the student’s parents or to
the student’s household.67 Again, the significance of this conclu-
sion cannot be overstated; the question of whether the benefit goes
to the citizen or to the household is a fundamental tension
between state and federal statutes governing the eligibility of U.S.
citizen children of undocumented immigrants to receive public
benefits. The Colorado Memorandum does not go into length on
this point, but it focuses on the fact that ultimately students—and
not their parents—are responsible for paying tuition.68 Seo
observes69 that this reasoning echoes the reasoning of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Reivitz.70 Reivitz
dealt with the ability of undocumented immigrants to receive pub-
lic benefits under a program that provided assistance to unem-
ployed parents (Aid to Families with Dependent Children AFDC-
UP).71 The court ultimately concluded that undocumented immi-
grant parents of citizen children were necessarily eligible for
AFDC-UP because the public benefit sought was to flow to the
U.S. citizen child, and a public benefit could not be withheld from
a U.S. citizen based on the alienage of the parent.72
The attorney general also concluded that Colorado law
allowed the U.S. citizen children to qualify as residents as long as
their parents could establish that Colorado was their domicile
under Colorado law.73 Significantly, for purposes of establishing
residency for tuition benefits, Colorado law defines domicile as a
“person’s true, fixed, and permanent home and a place of habita-
tion. It is the place where he intends to remain and to which he
expects to return when he leaves without intending to establish a
new domicile elsewhere.”74 This conception of how one establishes
residency for purposes of qualifying for in-state tuition benefits





69. Seo, supra note 17, at 347.
70. 830 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1987), amended by 842 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1988).
71. Id. at 1442-45.
72. Id. at 1451.
73. Colorado Memorandum, supra note 53.
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-7-102(2) (West 2013).
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To qualify as a resident for tuition purposes:
1. A person or, if that person is a dependent child, his or
her parent or parents must have established legal res-
idence in this state and must have maintained legal
residence in this state for at least 12 consecutive
months immediately prior to his or her initial enroll-
ment in an institution of higher education (emphasis
added).
“Legal residency” is a much higher burden than “domiciled within
the state.” In fact, there is case law that suggests an undocu-
mented immigrant can never be considered a legal resident of a
state. In Melian v. INS,75 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit was required to determine what Congress meant
when it used the phrase “lawful domicile” in a section of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.76 The court held that “lawful domi-
cile” means “at least the simultaneous existence of lawful physical
presence in the United States and lawful intent to remain in the
United States indefinitely.”77
Notwithstanding how a court may have interpreted Section
1009.21(2)(A), the definitive interpretation of “legal residence” can
be found in two identical provisions of Florida’s Administrative
Code. Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida
Administrative Code establish the requirements for receiving in-
state tuition benefits. The code states:
5) A non-United States citizen may be eligible to establish
residency for tuition purposes if evidence is presented veri-
fying that he or she is legally present in the United States,
has met the residency requirements of Section 1009.21,
F.S., and the person is one of the following:
(a) A foreign national in a nonimmigrant visa classification
that grants the person the legal ability to establish and
maintain a bona fide domicile in the United States accord-
ing to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (USCIS).
1. The following visa categories grant the person the legal
ability to establish and maintain a bona fide domicile in the
United States according to USCIS: A, E, G, H-1B, H-1C
(classification expires 12-20-2011), I, K, L, N, NATO 1-7, O-
1, R, S, T, U, and V.
2. The following visa categories do not grant the person the
75. Melian v. INS, 987 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir. 1993).
76. Id. at 1524.
77. Id.
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legal ability to establish and maintain a bona fide domicile
in the United States according to USCIS: B, C, D, F, M, P,
Q, and TN. J visa holders are not eligible to establish resi-
dency for tuition purposes except as provided in Section
1009.21(10), F.S.
3. The student, and parent if the student is a dependent,
must present evidence of legal presence in the United
States.78
These are the regulations challenged in Ruiz v. Robinson.79
If an advocacy group such as the SPLC was seeking to gener-
ally challenge the policy of denying in-state tuition benefits to the
U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants, the adminis-
trative scheme in Florida is an ideal target for such a challenge.
As explained above, most states do not have a clear policy and
resolve the question on a case-by-case basis. Such ad hoc policies
could only be constitutionally challenged as applied, and the liti-
gation would do little to bring about an overall change in policy.
Florida has a firmly established administrative code directing how
its residency statute should be applied. Unlike Virginia, the resi-
dency policy of Florida is particularly harmonious with Section
1623 of IIRIRA. It is unsurprising that Florida was the first state
to be targeted in federal court. Although related legal battles are
currently being waged elsewhere, Ruiz v. Robinson is the only fed-
eral challenge to a state policy of denying in-state tuition benefits
to the U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants who
would otherwise qualify for tuition benefits.80
Before delving into a more detailed analysis of Ruiz, one other
point should be made. The question of whether the dependent U.S.
citizen children of undocumented immigrants should be consid-
ered residents for purposes of in-state tuition benefits is like “a
fugue playing in the background” of the contentious debate over
how states and the federal government should treat undocu-
mented immigrants.81 The federal DREAM Act82 and its state
78. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) (2011).
79. Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
80. The website of the University of Houston Law Center continuously monitors
developments on these issues. For updates on recent cases involving undocumented
college student issues visit http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/undocumented-college-
student-issues/homepage.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
81. Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency And The
Response To Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 101 (2008).
82. S. 952, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?
c112:S.952:; H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c112:H.R.1842:.
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counterparts83 must also be a part of the discussion. Under the
DREAM Act, undocumented immigrants who have resided in the
United States for five or more years, possess good moral charac-
ter, and were brought to the United States prior to the their fif-
teenth birthday, may be eligible for permanent resident status.84
The DREAM Act would amend existing federal regulations that
restrict a state’s ability to grant in-state tuition benefits to
undocumented immigrants, and it will give individual states the
choice as to whether to allow beneficiaries of the DREAM Act to
qualify for in-state tuition benefits.85  The obvious irony is that,
under the DREAM Act, it would be possible for Florida to legally
deny U.S. citizens in-state tuition due to the immigration status of
their parents, while at the same time, other states could grant in-
state tuition to non-citizens. Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine
this actually being the case, but this is one illustration of how the
patchwork of state and federal statutes can lead to bizarre and
contradictory results.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF RUIZ V. ROBINSON
There are five named plaintiffs in Ruiz v. Robinson.86 All five
are dependent U.S. citizens who have resided continuously in
Florida and seek to earn post-secondary degrees from Florida pub-
lic institutions.87 As summarized by the court in its Order Grant-
ing In Part Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment and
Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the circum-
stances of each plaintiff are as follows:88
1. Wendy Ruiz was born in Miami and is a U.S. citizen by
virtue of birthright. Ruiz has resided in Florida for her
entire life and graduated from a public high school in
Florida. Ruiz attempted to enroll at Florida Interna-
tional University but was unable to furnish proof of her
parents’ legal residency in the U.S. She ultimately
matriculated to Miami Dade College where she was
classified as an out-of-state resident for tuition pur-
poses because she was a dependent student whose par-
83. See, e.g., In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students (2011), NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/in-state-tuition-and-
unauthorized-immigrants.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
84. S. 952, § 3.
85. Id. at § 9(b).
86. Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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ents could not prove that they were legal residents of
Florida under Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-
1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Administrative Code. Con-
sequently, Ruiz could not afford to enroll as a full-time
student and will not be able to complete a two-year
degree within two years.
2. Noel Saucedo was born in Miami and is a U.S. citizen
by virtue of birthright. Saucedo has resided in Florida
for the past six years and he graduated from a public
high school in Florida. Saucedo was unable to enroll at
Florida International University because he was una-
ble to furnish proof of his parents’ legal residency in the
U.S. Although Saucedo initially qualified for a full-
scholarship to Miami Dade College, he was classified as
an out-of-state resident for tuition purposes because he
was a dependent student whose parents could not
prove that they were legal residents of Florida under
Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the
Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, his schol-
arship was substantially reduced and he was unable to
afford to enroll as a full-time student. Like Ruiz,
Saucedo will not be able to complete his two-year
degree within two years.
3. Caroline Roa was born in Miami and is a U.S. citizen by
virtue of birthright. She has resided in Florida for her
entire life and her father has resided in Florida for the
past twenty-two years. Roa graduated from a public
high school in Florida. Roa was accepted to Miami
Dade College and was offered a full scholarship. How-
ever, Roa was classified as an out-of-state resident for
tuition purposes because she was a dependent student
whose parents cannot prove that they are legal
residents of Florida under Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and
72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Administrative Code
and her scholarship offer was withdrawn. Conse-
quently, Roa was unable to attend college.
4. Kassandra Romero was born in Los Angeles and is a
U.S. citizen by virtue of birthright. Romero has resided
in Florida continuously with her parents for the past
fourteen years. Romero graduated from a public high
school in Florida. She registered for classes at Palm
Beach State College but was unable to furnish proof of
her parents’ legal residency in the U.S. Consequently,
Romero was classified as an out-of-state resident for
tuition purposes because she was a dependent student
whose parents could not prove that they were legal
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residents of Florida under Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and
72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Administrative Code.
She was unable to afford classes at Palm Beach State
College  and, therefore, unable to attend college.
5. Janeth America Perez was born in Miami and is a U.S.
citizen by virtue of birthright. She has lived in Florida
for her entire life and her mother has resided in Florida
for the past twenty-five years. Perez graduated from a
public high school in Florida. Perez was accepted to
Miami Dade College but was unable to furnish proof of
her parents’ legal residency in the U.S. Consequently,
she was classified as an out-of-state resident for tuition
purposes because she was a dependent student whose
parents could not prove that they were legal residents
of Florida under Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-
1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Administrative Code. Una-
ble to afford college, she currently attends a U.S.
Department of Labor program that offers technical
training. Perez still hopes to attend college in the
future.
The specific circumstance of each plaintiff is significant for several
reasons.
First, it should be noted that each plaintiff could qualify for
in-state tuition benefits under alternative theories. If each plain-
tiff were to be considered independent for purposes of Section
1009.21,89 then each plaintiff would qualify for in-state tuition by
virtue of their residency in Florida. Under this theory, the restric-
tions of IIRIRA would not be triggered.90 Alternatively, if each
plaintiff’s parents were to be considered a legal resident of Florida
by virtue of their continuous domicile in Florida, the plaintiffs
would qualify for in-state tuition benefits. Under this theory, how-
ever, IIRIRA restrictions may be triggered.91
Second, the SPLC’s litigation strategy was to pursue this
claim as a class action.92 Therefore, it was essential that the
named plaintiffs be carefully selected so as to satisfy the common-
ality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).93 As an aside,
89. FLA. STAT. § 1009.21 (2011).
90. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8
U.S.C. § 1623.
91. See id.
92. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification at 2, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp.
2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 53).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law
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under the Florida statutory scheme a student is no longer classi-
fied as dependent upon reaching the age of twenty-four.94 There-
fore, in order to avoid mootness, each plaintiff must be under the
age of twenty-four in order to bring this challenge. Had the litiga-
tion become protracted, it is possible that the plaintiffs would
have all reached their twenty-fourth birthdays, mooting their
claims and terminating the lawsuit. Converting the claim into a
class action is one method of circumventing this problem because
the class of plaintiffs would continue to have a justiciable claim
even as individual plaintiffs reach the age of twenty-four. There is
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit that says that class certification
is appropriate in claims by juveniles that would become moot
when the plaintiffs reach the age of majority.95
Finally, each plaintiff’s story evokes sympathy. The plaintiffs
suffered harm solely because of the undocumented status of their
parents. This has legal significance because a fundamental tenet
of American jurisprudence is that the law should not punish chil-
dren for the sins of their parents. The U.S. Supreme Court has
suggested that any government action that punishes children for
the sins of their parents violates the Equal Protection Clause.96 In
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, the Court noted that
heightened scrutiny is appropriate when the government penal-
izes children for the illegal conduct of their parents.97 Sympathetic
plaintiffs are also useful from a practical perspective when it
comes to legal challenges to immigration law.98 Prof. Michael Oli-
vas has noted that the plight of undocumented immigrants whose
undocumented status is due to the illegal acts of their parents are
the most likely to receive amnesty from Congress.99  Similarly, it
would seem that U.S. citizens who reside within a state and are
classified as non-residents solely because of the undocumented
status of their parents are likely to win an Equal Protection
Challenge.
or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
94. FLA. STAT. § 1009.21 (2011).
95. Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1070 (5th Cir. 1981). Cases
decided in the Fifth Circuit prior to the Eleventh Circuit split have been adopted as
binding precedent by the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc).
96. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S. 450, 459 (1980).
97. Id. at 459.
98. See Olivas supra, note 31, at 1797.
99. Id.
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The plaintiffs’ complaint, as amended, only raised two
claims.100 Count One sought injunctive and declaratory relief
under Section 1983101 under the theory that Sections 6A-
10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Administrative
Code violated the Equal Protection Clause.102 The plaintiffs’ theory
was that Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) impermis-
sibly classified U.S. citizens based on the federal immigration sta-
tus of their parents.103 Count Two also sought injunctive and
declaratory relief under Section 1983, under a theory that Sec-
tions 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code violated the Supremacy Clause104 of the U.S.
Constitution.105 Because the court ultimately granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the first claim, the court
never considered the plaintiffs’ second claim.106 Accordingly, this
paper does not address the second claim.
For the most part, the facts of the case were undisputed.107
The State of Florida conceded that the plaintiffs accurately char-
acterized Florida’s system of determining eligibility for in-state
tuition and maintained that federal law required the state to clas-
sify students based on the immigration status of their parents.108
For their part, the plaintiffs conceded that they were properly
classified as non-residents for tuition purposes under the existing
statutory scheme.109 The State also did not contest that, if the
plaintiffs’ legal theory was correct, the plaintiffs would have suf-
fered a legally cognizable injury and would be entitled to the relief
sought.110 The only significant issue contested at the close of dis-
100. Amended Complaint at 24-25, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D.
Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 29).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
102. Amended Complaint at 24, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 29).
103. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 8-9, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.
Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 75).
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
105. Amended Complaint at 25, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 29).
106. Ruiz, 892 F. Supp. 2d. at 1333.
107. See Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment, supra note 103, at 3-8;
Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 3-
4, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM)
(ECF No. 85); Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 3-4, Ruiz v. Robinson,
892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 81).
108. Id.
109. Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary
Judgment, supra note 107, at 1-2.
110. Id.
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covery was whether the plaintiffs’ parents were residents of Flor-
ida.111 This wrangling over terminology actually goes to the
substance of the plaintiffs’ legal challenge and did not prevent the
court from disposing of the case through competing motions for
summary judgment.112 The dispute demonstrates the level of
nuance inherent in classifying dependent students (or minors in
general) for purposes of determining their eligibility for public
benefits. Had the Florida statute used the word “domiciled,” as did
Colorado, the statutory analysis might have been different. After
all, the legal definition of “domiciled” does not include a require-
ment of “lawful presence.”113
The plaintiffs’ argument appears straightforward at first. A
closer look will reveal that their claim goes to the heart of the
existing tensions between PRWORA, IIRIRA, and the various
residency requirements in each of the fifty states.  The plaintiffs
argue that, factually, they meet all of the statutory requirements
to qualify for in-state tuition benefits. Nonetheless, they remain
barred from receiving these benefits because they cannot establish
their parents’ federal immigration status so as to satisfy the
requirements of Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of
the Florida Administrative Code.114 This is where the complexity
of the plaintiffs’ claim demonstrates itself. The plaintiffs do not
contest that Florida has a right to classify between residents and
non-residents for tuition purposes.115 Nor do they contest, at least
not directly, the defendants’ claim that undocumented immigrants
cannot be considered legal residents of Florida.116 They instead
argue that the administrative policies of Florida are such that the
plaintiffs cannot be considered residents of any state at all. Thus,
Sections 6A-10.044(4)(a) and 72-1.001(5)(a)(3) of the Florida
Administrative Code discriminate against the U.S. citizen plain-
tiffs based on the alienage of their parents. Because of their par-
ents’ alienage, the plaintiffs are treated differently from similarly-
situated dependent students who are U.S. citizens and whose par-
ents have resided continuously in the State of Florida for twelve
111. See Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary
Judgment at 10, n.5., Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-
cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 81).
112. Id.
113. See Melian v. INS, 987 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993).
114. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 8-9, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.
Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 75).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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months prior to their application to a public institution of higher
learning. Also, because of their parents’ alienage, it would take
the plaintiffs six years longer than their peers to establish Florida
residency. The plaintiffs would not qualify for Florida residency
until they turned twenty-four, but a similarly-situated U.S. citi-
zen could establish Florida residency after twelve months so long
as their parents resided in the state continuously for those twelve
months.117
Their argument stretches the limits of the plain language of
Section 1621 of PRWORA.118 That section specifically limits the
ability of states to confer public postsecondary education benefits
on the households of undocumented immigrants. The relevant
portions of Section 1621 are as follows:
(a) In general:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as
provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section, any alien
who is not [covered under subsections (1), (2), or (3), text
omitted] is not eligible for any State or local public benefit
(as defined in subsection (c) of this section).
* * *
(c) “State or local public benefit” defined
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for pur-
poses of this subchapter the term “State or local public ben-
efit” means –
* * *
(B) any . . . postsecondary education . . . benefit, or any
other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are
provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility
unit by an agency of a State or local government or by
appropriate funds of a State or local government.
* * *
(d) State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens
for State and local public benefits:
A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully pre-
sent in the United States is eligible for any State or local
public benefit to which such alien would otherwise be ineli-
gible under subsection (a) of this section only through the
enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.
The plaintiffs attempt to avoid PRWORA in two ways.
117. Id.
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1621.
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Their first argument is that residency classifications are not
“payments or assistance” as defined by the statute.119 Citing a
decision from the Eastern District of Virginia that defines “pay-
ments or assistance” under PRWORA as referring only to “mone-
tary assistance paid,”120 the plaintiffs argue that residency
classifications merely determine the rate owed. Further, because
in-state residents are given other forms of preferential considera-
tion, classification as an in-state residents is something separate
and beyond “payments or assistance.” Their second argument is
that in-state tuition is not a “household” benefit, but a benefit
which attaches to the student as an individual. Because the indi-
vidual students are U.S. citizens, the restrictions of PRWORA
cannot be implicated. In support of this proposition, they cite the
Colorado Memorandum, which affirms that tuition benefits flow
to the individual student and not to the household. They also cite
a recent decision from a New Jersey state appellate court that
overturned a similar administrative regulation.121
Unsurprisingly, both the defendants’ opposition to the plain-
tiffs’ claims and the substance of their own summary judgment
motion is that federal law essentially mandates Florida’s poli-
cies.122  By maintaining that classification as a resident for tuition
purposes is a household benefit under PRWORA, it would be
impossible to classify the plaintiffs as residents for tuition pur-
poses without, “opening the proverbial floodgates to all United
States citizens and their children—even those with no presence in
Florida whatsoever—. . . effectively reset[ting] tuition at the lower
rates, eliminating preferences for those persons who otherwise
meet Florida’s legal residency requirements, and their dependent
children . . .”123 This would result in a net loss of $200,000,000 in
119. Plaintiffs’ Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion
and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion at 2-3, Ruiz v.
Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No.
89).
120. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004).
121. A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth., 2012 WL 3192641,
at * 3-4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 8, 2012).
122. Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary
Judgment at 11-14, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-
cv-23776-KMM) (ECF. No. 85); Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 5-12,
Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM)
(ECF. No. 81).
123. Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary
Judgment at 11, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321  (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-
23776-KMM) (ECF No. 85).
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tuition revenue per year.124 Such a devastating financial blow to
the state cannot be required.
Although both the plaintiffs and the defendants acknowledge
that their positions hinge on whether in-state tuition benefits
should be properly viewed as flowing to the individual U.S. citizen
student or to the student’s household, neither party explicitly
addresses how the distinction between dependent and indepen-
dent students can survive if in-state tuition is not a household
benefit.125 The avoidance of this central issue is likely explained by
the fact that neither party seeks to challenge the general principle
that dependent students must establish residency via their par-
ents. If in-state tuition benefits are properly seen as flowing to the
individual, what justification can there ever be for looking to the
residency of the student’s parents?
California’s statute, discussed above, suggests one method for
solving this problem.126 It allows students to receive in-state tui-
tion based on attendance of a California high school.127 In 2010, a
group of U.S. citizens who were not residents of California and
were paying non-resident tuition to attend California universities
brought a class action suit against The Regents of the University
of California.128 The crux of their challenge was that PRWORA
and IIRIRA preempted the California statute and made it unlaw-
ful for the state to allow undocumented immigrants to receive in-
state tuition under any circumstances. The Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia ultimately denied the challenge, finding that California’s
statute is consistent with the federal regulatory scheme.129  It is
unclear whether a federal court would concur if the statute were
challenged in federal court.
Although the Martinez decision did not resolve the question of
under what circumstances a state can provide in-state tuition ben-
efits to undocumented immigrants under PRWORA and IIRIRA,
it is clear that there is no major constitutional problem with such
statutes. It is well-settled law that both the state and federal gov-
124. Id. at 12.
125. See Plaintiffs’ Combined Opposition To Defendants’ Motion For Summary
Judgment And Reply In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 4-5,
Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF
No. 89).
126. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2002).
127. Id.
128. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859 (Cal. 2010).
129. Id. at 1298-1300.
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ernment can create classifications based on alienage.130 Any other
position would “obliterate all distinctions between citizens and
aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.”131
However, when a state’s residency requirements begin to take into
account the immigration status of a U.S. citizen’s parents, these
requirements may violate the Equal Protection Clause.132
The court’s opinion in Ruiz does not conclusively resolve these
issues. In granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on
their first claim, the court holds that the defendants’ argument
necessarily fails because the defendants have “fundamentally mis-
construed PRWORA.”133 Because, under the plain language of
PRWORA, the plaintiffs are not aliens, the court determines that
PRWORA cannot bear on the state’s decision to classify the plain-
tiffs as non-residents for tuition purposes.134 The court does not
directly address the argument over whether in-state tuition bene-
fits flow to the household so as to implicate PRWORA. The opinion
does not explain its conclusion that the defendants have “funda-
mentally misconstrued” PRWORA. The court does state that its
conclusion is “bolstered” by the fact that the benefits attach to the
students and not the parents.135 It even cites the Colorado Memo-
randum in support of this observation.136 But it does not directly
address how dependency classifications can survive this conclu-
sion.137 The court simply finds that PRWORA and IIRIRA do not
require Florida to offer in-state tuition rates to all U.S. citizens
without further exploration of the consequences.138 Therefore, the
opinion seems to imply that PRWORA and IIRIRA simply have no
bearing on the state’s residency classification system.
IV. THE LANDSCAPE OF THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER
RUIZ V. ROBINSON
The conclusion reached by the court in Ruiz seems obvious
and intuitively correct. Given the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection under the law, it seems impossible to imagine
that any state action that denies residency benefits to U.S. citi-
130. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
131. Id. at 295 (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
133. Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id at 1330-31.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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zens because of the acts of their parents could ever pass constitu-
tional muster.139 Yet, states have engaged in this practice since at
least since 1990.140 However, even if the practice is unconstitu-
tional, as Judge Moore concluded in Ruiz, and obviously so, as
Prof. Olivas alleges, the practice has neither been widely chal-
lenged nor made the focal point of immigration reform efforts.141
Olivas suggests that the lack of attention that this issue has
received can be explained by the political motives of those who
would potentially challenge such practices.142 Activists who believe
in more accommodating policies toward undocumented immi-
grants choose not to devote their scarce resources to the problems
faced by the U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants.143
After all, “the issue is so absurd, and so wide of the mark that it
will resolve itself once the light is shown upon the offending prac-
tice.”144 Meanwhile, “nativists are so determined to extirpate
undocumented parents that they have tolerated these practices as
the inevitable work of birthright citizenship being extended to
their undeserving children.”145
This political explanation has some merit, but it is too basic.
A major reason why this seemingly obvious injustice is both prev-
alent in state universities, and seemingly resistant to challenge, is
because this issue arises at the intersection of immigration policy
and education policy. Activist groups for immigration reform may
be disinclined to take their resources away from the problem of
tuition for undocumented college students––a cause that has
received substantial political attention in the debate over the
DREAM Act146––and focus on the plight of U.S. citizen children of
undocumented immigrants. They may justifiably fear that further
139. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U. S. 450, 459 (1980).
140. Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education, Financial Aid, Residency, and
Undocumented Parents of U.S. Citizen College Students, UNIV. OF HOUS. L. CTR. INST.
FOR HIGHER EDUC. & GOVERNANCE, http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/undocumented
parents/homepage.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). Olivas identifies E.C. v. Obergfell,
No. 1:06-CV-0359-DFH-WTL, (S.D. Ind. 2006) as the first legal challenge to such a
practice. The policy challenged in that case had been in effect since 1990; see also
Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, E.C. v. Obergfell, No.
1:06-CV-0359-DFH-WTL (S.D. Ind. 2006).





146. See Olivas, supra, note 31, at 1757-58 (discussing the surprisingly substantial
role that the DREAM Act played in the 2007/2008 election season given the relatively
small number of people who would benefit from enactment of the DREAM Act).
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litigation in this area could upset the entire system used by state
universities to award tuition benefits. The decision in Ruiz poten-
tially threatens the long-standing practice of many states of using
dependency as a factor in awarding tuition benefits. Advocacy
groups may be deterred from pursuing cases such as Ruiz because
courts may be reluctant to render a decision that would result in a
substantial financial blow to the economy of the state.
As discussed above, Judge Moore’s decision rested on the
assumption that tuition benefits should properly be seen as flow-
ing to the individual student and not the household.147 The state of
Florida maintained that if tuition benefits are viewed as a house-
hold benefit, the provisions of Section 1623 would be triggered and
the state would lose approximately $200,000,000.00 in revenue
annually.148 The court wrote that that PRWORA and IIRIRA do
not require Florida to extend in-state tuition benefits to all U.S.
citizens, but this conclusion could potentially be challenged in sub-
sequent litigation. Surely persons under the age of 24 that are
domiciled in Florida, but are classified as nonresidents for tuition
purposes because they are dependents of persons who live outside
the state of Florida, would have reason to bring such a challenge.
The risk that Ruiz could set precedent that ultimately undermines
the ability of states to award tuition benefits to households rather
than individuals is yet another reason why the immigration issues
raised by Ruiz should be resolved by federal action.  The decep-
tively simple opinion in Ruiz leaves several questions unan-
swered. First, it is unclear how the opinion affects the obligations
of Florida under federal law. The decision may have some unin-
tended consequences for students who seek to establish residency
independent of their parents.149 Second, it is difficult to predict
whether the decision in Ruiz would be applicable as a persuasive
authority if challenges were brought against similar policies in
other states. Florida is unique in that its policy of classifying the
U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants as nonresi-
dents for tuition purposes was enshrined in the administrative
code. However, many other states simply have statutes that dele-
gate such residency determinations to individual universities on a
147. See supra Part III.
148. Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 12, Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.
Supp. 2d 1321  (S.D. Fla. 2012) (ECF. No. 81); Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 14, Ruiz v. Robinson at 6, 892 F. Supp.
2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 11-cv-23776-KMM) (ECF No. 85).
149. FLA. STAT. § 1009.21 (2011).
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case-by-case basis.150 Many universities may have a policy of look-
ing to the immigration status of the parents, but this may be
extraordinarily difficult to prove. The U.S. Supreme Court has
been willing to give states a fair amount of leeway in making resi-
dency determinations for tuition purposes. “A State has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its
colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide
residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition
basis.”151
Another factor that makes it difficult to predict the reach of
Ruiz is that U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants
can be denied the benefits of residency in other ways. For exam-
ple, one of the earliest lawsuits regarding the denial of educa-
tional benefits to the U.S. citizen children of undocumented
immigrants centered on an administrative policy that governed
the awarding of Indiana’s Twenty First Century Scholars pro-
gram.152 Indiana law had set certain minimum requirements that
students must meet in order to qualify for the scholarship,153 but
the Indiana Administrative Code gave the Executive Director of
the State Student Assistance Commission of Indiana Scholarships
authority to set his own policies and criterion for eligibility.154 The
Executive Director had set a policy of denying scholarship benefits
to otherwise-eligible students if their parents were undocu-
mented.155 That case was ultimately settled. Similarly, the New
Jersey case—cited by both the attorney general of Colorado in his
memorandum and by the Plaintiffs in Ruiz—did not address in-
state tuition, but focused on a New Jersey regulation that allowed
U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants to be denied
certain scholarship benefits.156 In the absence of comprehensive
federal action, every aspect of a state’s educational policy may
infringe on the rights of the U.S. citizen children of undocumented
immigrants until separately challenged.
The parade of disasters that could potentially arise from a
150. Seo, supra note 17, at 325-26.
151. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973).
152. Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, E.C. v.
Obergfell, No. 1:06-CV-0359-DFH-WTL (S.D. Ind. 2006).
153. IND. CODE § 20-12-70-1 to -15 (2006), repealed by IND. P.L.2-2007, Sec.390.,
2007.
154. 585 IND. ADMIN. CODE 8-2-7 (2006).
155. Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, E.C. v.
Obergfell, No. 1:06-CV-0359-DFH-WTL (S.D. Ind. 2006).
156. A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth., 2012 WL 3192641,
at * 3-4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 8, 2012).
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strictly literalist reading of state and federal law in the aftermath
of Ruiz is unlikely to occur. What is more troubling about the deci-
sion in Ruiz is that it does not address the nationwide problem.
Instead, it is just one more in a patchwork of incongruous immi-
gration decisions regarding matters of state law.157 If this pattern
of addressing immigration problems at the state level persists, the
entire constitutional structure of immigration law could be imper-
iled.158 The ability of U.S. citizen children to access public benefits
for post-secondary education is certainly important. Although
access to post-secondary education is not recognized as a funda-
mental right under the U.S. Constitution, even the defendants in
Ruiz concede the importance of post-secondary education. In 2011,
the unemployment rate among persons with a bachelor’s degree
was almost half of those with only a high school diploma and those
with a bachelor’s degree earned almost $500.00 more per week
than those with only a high school diploma.159 Legal barriers to
attaining a post-secondary education can have devastating and
lifelong consequences. But even the most fundamental elements of
U.S. immigration law are imperiled by the devolution of immigra-
tion policy into a matter of state law.
Birthright citizenship is perhaps the most basic aspect of the
national immigration policy with its roots in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.160  Yet, in 2011, a bill was
introduced in the Arizona legislature that would deny state citi-
zenship to children of undocumented immigrants161 and require
the issuance of separate birth certificates for such children.162
Although the legislation was not passed and would most certainly
be successfully challenged as a violation of the U.S. Constitution,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States suggests
that, in the face of federal inaction, courts will be more tolerant of
immigration initiatives at the state level. What is clear is that the
problem will only be definitively resolved through Congressional
action.
157. Haynes, supra note 7, at 301.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10 (1979).
159. Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing
Education Pays, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (Mar. 23, 2012)),
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703
(1898).
161. H.B. 2561, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); S.B. 1309, 50th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
162. H.B. 2562, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); S.B. 1308, 50th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
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